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THE LESSON OF THE 2011 NFL AND NBA LOCKOUTS:
WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY
RECOGNIZE PLAYERS’ UNION DISCLAIMERS OF
REPRESENTATION
Ross Siler
Abstract: The NFL and NBA lockouts of 2011 challenged the limits of the balance courts
have struck between collective bargaining protections and antitrust liability. In each lockout,
the respective players’ union argued that the bargaining relationship with team owners ended
once the union disclaimed interest in continuing as its players’ bargaining representative. The
players further argued that with the bargaining relationship terminated, the nonstatutory labor
exemption no longer shielded owners from antitrust liability for their cooperative agreements
and activity. Ultimately, both lockouts settled without courts deciding whether a disclaimer
of representation marks what the Supreme Court has described as an “extreme outer
boundary” that is “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances” from the bargaining
process such that the nonstatutory labor exemption might no longer protect employers from
antitrust liability. This Comment argues that courts should be wary of recognizing
disclaimers as terminating the exemption in the wake of the 2011 lockouts. Instead, courts
should extend the exemption for a reasonable period following disclaimer. By doing so,
courts would reduce the possibility of introducing instability and uncertainty in the
bargaining process, which the Court has recognized in the past as a significant concern. Such
an extension also would help separate deserving antitrust claims from mere bargaining tactics
while allowing the economic pressures facing both sides to shape their ultimate agreement.

INTRODUCTION
For professional football and basketball fans, 2011 will be
remembered as the “Year of the Lockout.” After collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) in the National Football League (NFL) and National
Basketball Association (NBA) expired, team owners in each league
locked out their players for months until new CBAs could be reached.1
With hundreds of millions of dollars at stake in these bitter labor
1. See Complaint at 1, Anthony v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, No. C11-05525 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15,
2011) [hereinafter Anthony Complaint]; Complaint at 1, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F.
Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11CV00639) [hereinafter Brady Complaint]; Brief for Major
League Baseball Players’ Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 14, Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898), 2011 WL 2129898 (“A
‘lockout’ occurs when an owner temporarily stops ‘furnishing . . . work to employees in an effort to
get for the employer more desirable terms’ and a ‘fundamental purpose underlying economic
lockouts is that the union may end the lockout and return the employees to work by agreeing to the
employer’s demands.’”) (quoting 2 JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1638,
1672 (5th ed. 2006)).
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battles, players in both leagues followed the same legal game plan—
dissolving their unions and accusing the owners of antitrust violations.2
The players’ union in each league—the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) and National Basketball Players
Association (NBPA)—disclaimed its interest in continuing to serve as its
respective players’ bargaining representative.3 Although the disclaimers
were not formal decertifications, the players asserted that the disclaimers
dissolved their unions in identical fashion.4 Accordingly, the players
said, labor law no longer shielded the owners from antitrust litigation.5
Following the disclaimers, players in each league filed class-action
antitrust suits, claiming that the owners had engaged in group boycotts
and attempted price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.6 The players
argued that by dissolving their unions, they had abandoned collective
bargaining and the owners were now liable under antitrust law.7 The
players could have achieved the same result by decertifying their unions,
but decertification brings additional logistical and legal consequences.8
By disclaiming, the players dissolved their unions through a less
demanding and more immediate process, but one with less certainty in
litigation.9 The resulting legal battles in both leagues involved some of
the biggest stars in each sport, as well as several of the country’s most
prominent lawyers.10

2. See Howard Beck, After a Stagnant 12 Months, the N.B.A. Faces its Own Labor Countdown,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at B11. Tulane sports law professor Gabe Feldman said: “I think the
N.B.A. and N.B.P.A. can sort of go to school on what’s happening right now” in the NFL. Id. He
also said, “There are certainly different pressure points for each, but the general strategy we’re
seeing could be the same.” Id.
3. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22.
4. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 21–22; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. A
decertification is a formal election concerning a union’s status as an employees’ bargaining
representative. See infra Part III.
5. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 21–22; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 17–18; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 39–40.
The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), declares that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce is illegal.
7. Brady Complaint supra note 1, at 3, 27–30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. Three of the plaintiffs in the NFL players’ suit were Super Bowl-winning quarterbacks Tom
Brady, Peyton Manning, and Drew Brees. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 5–6, 31–32;
Clifton Brown, End of the Rainbow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at D1. Two of the plaintiffs in the
NBA players’ suit were star players Carmelo Anthony and Kevin Durant. See Anthony Complaint,
supra note 1, at 8, 19; Jonathan Abrams, This is the Way Durant Signs: Not with a Bang but on
Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at B13. Among the lawyers who represented the players and
owners were David Boies, Paul Clement and Theodore Olson. See Judy Battista, N.F.L. Hires
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The biggest difference between each lockout was the timing of each
union’s disclaimer. The NFLPA disclaimed representation the day
before the CBA was set to expire; its players filed suit concurrently as
the football owners imposed a lockout.11 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit
rejected a U.S. District Court judge’s injunction of the lockout.12
However, the Eighth Circuit offered no opinion on the merits of the
players’ antitrust claims or the effectiveness of the disclaimer of
representation.13 The Eighth Circuit held only that the District Court
could not enjoin the lockout under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,14 which
restricts courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving or growing
out of a labor dispute.15
By contrast, the locked-out NBA players attempted to negotiate a new
CBA with owners for four-and-a-half months after their CBA expired
before the NBPA disclaimed representation.16 The basketball players
filed suit the following day.17 By then, NBA Commissioner David Stern
already had canceled the season’s first month.18 In the end, the NBA
players never progressed beyond the filing stage in their suit.19 With the
league facing the possibility of a lost season, the owners and players
settled the suit and reached agreement on a new CBA two weeks after
the NBPA’s disclaimer.20
Both unions’ suits challenged the balance that courts have attempted
to strike in labor jurisprudence between laws encouraging collective
bargaining and laws discouraging anti-competitive behavior by either
side. To strike this balance, courts have endorsed a so-called
nonstatutory labor exemption, which allows employers some freedom to

Attorneys for Suit Against Players, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/13/sports/football/13boies.html; Judy Battista, Headed Back to Court, N.F.L. May Gain Clarity,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at B13; Ken Belson, Lawyer for N.F.L. in Lockout Joins Players in
N.B.A. Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at B14.
11. Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22.
12. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011).
13. Id. at 682.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
15. Brady, 644 F.3d at 680–82.
16. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4; Howard Beck, N.B.A. Season in Peril as Players
Reject Offer and Disband Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1.
17. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4.
18. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Stall, and More Games Are Canceled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011,
at D4.
19. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to Save Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at
A1.
20. Id.

15 - Siler Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2013 7:01 PM

284

[Vol. 88:281

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

act in cooperation without violating antitrust laws.21 Even in cases where
employers and unions have taken entrenched positions, courts have
refused to expose employers to antitrust liability given what they cite as
a congressional preference for collective bargaining—even strained and
stalled bargaining.22 In its most significant ruling on the subject, the
Supreme Court in 1996 held in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.23 that NFL
owners could impose salary restrictions for a new subclass of players
after bargaining to an impasse with the NFLPA on the subject.24 In an 81 decision, the Court sided with the owners, expressing concern about
the potentially destabilizing effect that antitrust liability could have on
collective bargaining in such circumstances.25
However, the Court held that such protection from antitrust liability
does not continue indefinitely for employers negotiating with a union.26
The Court held that “an agreement among employers could be
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not
significantly interfere with that process.”27 The Court suggested that the
nonstatutory labor exemption would last until the collapse of the
collective bargaining relationship.28 But the Court expressly declined to
define the limits where the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer
would shield an employer from antitrust liability.29
After dissolving their unions by disclaiming representation in 2011,
the NFL and NBA players argued that the collective bargaining
relationship had ended and therefore the nonstatutory labor exemption
no longer protected the owners from antitrust liability.30 As support, the
players looked to Brown, in which the Court signaled that the formal
decertification of a union would mark the collapse of collective
bargaining.31 However, the 2011 lockouts failed to resolve several

21. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
22. Id. at 249–50.
23. 518 U.S. 231.
24. Id. at 233–34.
25. Id. at 241–42.
26. Id. at 250.
27. Id.
28. Id. (The Court endorsed the “suggest[ion] that exemption lasts until collapse of the collectivebargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union.”).
29. Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within these extreme outer
boundaries to draw that line.”).
30. Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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significant questions based on the players’ contention. Does a union’s
disclaimer of representation suffice as a collapse of the collective
bargaining relationship? Is a disclaimer of representation “sufficiently
distant in time and in circumstances” from the bargaining process such
that the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer should shield employers
from antitrust liability?32 Does a disclaimer of representation amount to
one of the “extreme outer boundaries” noted in Brown where the line
between collective-bargaining protections and antitrust liability should
be drawn?33 Although a U.S. District Court judge issued a favorable
ruling for the NFL players, the Eighth Circuit reached no conclusion,
leaving these questions unanswered.34
Although the 2011 lockouts had particular importance in the sports
world, this Comment argues that courts should be wary of accepting
disclaimers of representation as extinguishing the nonstatutory labor
exemption. Courts should either defer to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) in determining whether a disclaimer amounts to a goodfaith termination of collective bargaining, or extend antitrust protection
to employers for a reasonable period following a union’s disclaimer. The
destabilizing effect on collective bargaining that concerned the Court in
Brown is just as apparent when a union’s unilateral and instantaneous
disclaimer can expose employers to antitrust liability. Much as the NFL
owners argued in 2011, Brown represents a “fundamental recognition
that the labor laws cannot function unless collective bargaining is given
significant room to operate, even after one side unilaterally asserts that
the relationship is over.”35 A union’s instantaneous renunciation of
collective bargaining through a disclaimer—as opposed to a formal
decertification—threatens the collective bargaining and antitrust balance
that courts have attempted to strike.
Part I of this Comment offers background about both leagues’
lockouts in 2011. Parts II, III and IV examine the background of the
nonstatutory labor exemption, the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, and
the differences between disclaimers and decertification of unions
respectively. Part V recounts the NFL players’ 1989 and 1991 court
battles that served as precedent for the 2011 lockouts. Part VI explores
the NFL players’ suit in 2011 and the subsequent victories and defeats in
court. Part VII addresses the NBA players’ suit in 2011 and the quick
32. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
33. Id.
34. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 682 (8th Cir. 2011).
35. See Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 35, Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11CV00639).
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resolution that followed out of court. Finally, Part VIII argues that future
courts faced with a players’ union’s disclaimer of representation,
followed by an antitrust suit, should extend nonstatutory labor
exemption protections for a reasonable period following such disclaimer.
I.

BOTH THE NFL AND NBA ENDURED MONTHS-LONG
LOCKOUTS IN 2011 OVER THE SPLIT OF REVENUES IN
EACH LEAGUE

Two of the world’s most prominent professional sports leagues, the
NFL and NBA are composed of dozens of separately owned and
independently operated teams—thirty-two teams in the NFL and thirty
teams in the NBA.36 A CBA governs the labor relationship in each
league—in particular, player-salary rules and restrictions—and is the
product of negotiations between the owners and players.37 The NFL and
NBA players traditionally have been represented by unions, who in turn
bargain with the owners regarding terms of the CBA.38 But the labor
relationship in both leagues broke down in 2011 as players and owners
battled over the future split of revenues in their respective new CBAs.39
With no agreement, the owners in each league locked out the players and
effectively suspended operations.40
During the lockouts, contact between teams and players ceased—
players could not train at team facilities, and teams could not sign
players to contracts.41 The NBA went so far as to remove all images of
active players from its website.42 The NFL lockout was its first since
1987; the NBA lockout was its first since 1999.43 And with their
respective lockouts overlapping in July 2011, the two leagues made
sports history: for only the second time, two of the four major
36. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 6–7; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–9.
37. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–21.
38. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–21.
39. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–22, Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 11CV00639);
Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
40. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 23; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
41. See Judy Battista, End of N.F.L. Lockout is Imminent, if Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011,
at D5; Howard Beck & Richard Sandomir, Lockout is to Be Partially Lifted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2011, at B18; Howard Fendrich, Lockout Leaves NFL in Limbo After Talks Break Off, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6205936.
42. See Howard Beck, Players Are Locked Out of N.B.A.’s Web Site, Too, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2011, at D6.
43. See Judy Battista, As N.F.L. Talks Fail, ‘11 Season Seems in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2011, at A1; Howard Beck, Stalemate in Labor Talks Forces N.B.A. to Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2011, at B9.
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professional sports leagues shut down simultaneously due to labor
strife.44
Owners in both leagues sought an increased percentage of revenues
they share with players.45 While the NFL owners did not dispute their
teams’ profitability under the expired CBA, the NBA claimed that as
many as twenty-two of its thirty teams lost more than $300 million
combined during the previous season.46
The two lockouts stretched for months.47 The NFL endured a 136-day
lockout before owners and players agreed to a ten-year CBA—the
longest sports labor deal in history.48 The lone scheduling casualty was
the cancellation of an annual preseason game.49 Otherwise, the owners
and players reached agreement in time for teams to hold training camps
and play full schedules.50 By contrast, the NBA’s 149-day lockout also
produced a new CBA, but not in time to salvage a full season of
games.51 The season began nearly eight weeks late on December 25,
with the lost games costing both the owners and players an estimated
$400 million each.52 Instead of the usual eighty-two games, each team
played only sixty-six games in the 2011–12 season.53

44. Brian Mahoney, NBA Lockout Begins As Sides Fail to Reach New Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 1, 2011, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645. The four major
professional sports leagues are Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the
National Football League, and the National Hockey League. The other time two of the four leagues
shut down simultaneously came in 1994 when Major League Baseball players went on strike and
National Hockey League owners locked out players. Id. Baseball’s work stoppage that year
ultimately led to the cancellation of the World Series. Id.
45. See Joe Drape, Lockout is Strategy With Risks For Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at
SP1; Beck, supra note 43. The NFL owners wanted $1 billion in revenues previously shared with
players. See Drape, supra. The owners also wanted to lengthen the season from sixteen to eighteen
games. Id.
46. See Battista, supra note 43; Beck, supra note 43. According to Forbes magazine, seventeen of
thirty NBA teams lost money the previous season. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43.
47. See Beck, supra note 19 (NBA); Jarrett Bell, Done Deal, NFL on Fast Track, USA TODAY,
July 26, 2011, at 1C (NFL).
48. See Bell, supra note 47, at 1C.
49. See Judy Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2011, at
B10. The NFL owners ratified the proposal 31-0 and player representatives from the thirty teams
unanimously approved the deal on July 25, 2011. Id. The first NFL training camps opened two days
later. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Beck, supra note 19.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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IF NOT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
AND THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION, TEAM
OWNERS COULD FACE ANTITRUST LIABILITY

Courts have long recognized the inherent conflict between antitrust
laws (such as the Sherman Act54 and the Clayton Act55) that encourage
economic competition and labor laws (such as the National Labor
Relations Act,56 Clayton Act,57 and Norris-LaGuardia Act58) that express
a preference for resolving labor-management disputes through collective
bargaining.59 One labor law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
encourages collective bargaining by allowing workers to form unions to
negotiate terms and conditions of employment.60 At the same time,
workers have the right not to be represented by a union.61 Other labor
laws, including the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act, limit federal
courts from enjoining union activities.62 Courts recognize that successful
collective bargaining requires cooperative activity both by employers
and workers.63 And so long as restraints on competition are imposed
through collective bargaining, courts will generally shield such
cooperative activity from antitrust liability.64 The collective bargaining

54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
55. Id. § 12.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–58 (2006).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2006). Section 6 of the Clayton Act creates a basic statutory
exemption for labor unions: “[N]or shall such organizations . . . be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 17.
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–05, 113 (2006).
59. See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the
Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2012).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.”).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 157; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1225 n.16.
62. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 253 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissent); Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
63. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15; 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (“As a
matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and
employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or
with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the
process work or its results mutually acceptable.”).
64. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237.
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must be lawful under labor law and primarily affect the limited labor
market the bargaining relationship encompasses.65
The Supreme Court has recognized a “proper accommodation” as
necessary to further both congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining through the NLRA and congressional policy promoting
economic competition under antitrust law.66 This balancing requires
shielding some union-employer agreements from antitrust liability under
the nonstatutory labor exemption.67 The exemption extends the same
protections from antitrust liability for cooperative union activity to
cooperative activity for multiemployer units.68 The D.C. Circuit has
emphasized that the exemption is focused on the “process” surrounding
collective bargaining and not the ultimate “product” of a collective
bargaining agreement.69 The court also stressed the need to safeguard the
“delicate balance of countervailing power” belonging to employers and
workers in the bargaining process.70 As courts have interpreted the
nonstatutory labor exemption, employees face a choice during
bargaining of taking advantage of the collective bargaining process and
the protections of labor law—such as the right to strike or bring an
action before the NLRB—or foregoing those protections to bring an
antitrust suit, but not both together.71
Despite the public’s interest in professional sports, the Supreme Court
also has made clear that the various leagues, teams, and players
generally are entitled no special treatment under antitrust law.72 In
professional sports, the nature of a league of independently owned and
operated teams inherently conflicts with the Sherman Act’s prohibitions
65. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1048.
66. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975).
67. See id.; Brown, 518 U.S. at 234, 237; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1224.
68. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 134 (3d ed.
2006) (“Whenever a collective bargaining agreement results in antitrust immunity for employees,
the same immunity must presumably be afforded to employers bargaining or preparing to bargain
on the other side of the same table. Thus the ‘non-statutory’ exemption [exists] . . . . The question is
one of applying simple logic to labor policy, and the logic applies equally to single employers and
multi-employer bargaining groups, provided that the latter are all involved in the same bargaining
with the same set of unions over the same terms.”).
69. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1050.
70. Id. at 1052.
71. See id. at 1057; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1247–48 (observing that “Brown appears
to present employees with an either-or proposition” regarding labor or antitrust law).
72. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 248 (“We can understand how professional sports may be special in
terms of, say, interest, excitement, or concern. But we do not understand how they are special in
respect to labor law’s antitrust exemption.”).
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against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.73
Teams compete on and off the field for championships, fan interest, and
revenues.74 However, teams also must cooperate regarding rules,
scheduling, roster sizes, and numerous other issues.75 Courts recognize
that some anti-competitive restraints are acceptable to foster competitive
balance in a league.76 As described by the Second Circuit in 2004, the
NFL and NBA engage in a collective bargaining relationship with their
players that is “provided for” and “promoted by” federal labor law.77
Although the teams are independently owned, they can act jointly as a
multiemployer bargaining unit in setting the terms and conditions of
their players’ employment and their sport’s rules.78 As long as they set
these terms and conditions through collective bargaining, the owners can
operate a league of teams without facing antitrust liability.79
However, with the collective bargaining relationship in both leagues
tested in 2011, the NFL and NBA players challenged the limits of the
nonstatutory labor exemption in their antitrust suits.80 They argued that
the exemption no longer applied because they had dissolved their unions
and therefore no longer were engaged in a bargaining relationship.81 A
ruling in favor of the players would have exposed owners in both
leagues to enormous potential liability, with the Clayton Act providing
for the recovery of treble (triple) damages by a successful antitrust
plaintiff.82 And the players looked to the Supreme Court’s Brown
decision to frame the nonstatutory labor exemption’s parameters.

73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct.
2201, 2207 (2010).
74. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
75. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004); Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir. 1995) (“In the sports industry, multiemployer
bargaining exists not only for the reasons stated above but also because some terms and conditions
of employment must be the same for all teams in a sports league.”).
76. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (“We do recognize,
as did the district court, that the NFL has a strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive
balance among its teams.”).
77. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 30–32.
81. See supra notes 30–32.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
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III. IN BROWN, THE COURT CLARIFIED THAT THE
EXEMPTION WILL NOT APPLY INDEFINITELY, BUT
DECLINED TO DEFINE ITS “EXTREME OUTER
BOUNDARIES”
In 1996, the Supreme Court explored the boundaries of the
relationship between collective bargaining protections and antitrust
liability and the limits of the nonstatutory labor exemption in Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.83 The Court heard the appeal of a class-action suit
brought by a group of football players against NFL owners.84 In an 8-1
decision, the Court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption protected
the owners from antitrust liability for their imposition of terms after
reaching an impasse in bargaining with the NFLPA.85 The Court’s ruling
that the nonstatutory labor exemption could extend beyond impasse—
but not indefinitely—would have important implications when the NFL
and NBA players’ unions disclaimed representation and argued that this
had terminated the collective bargaining relationship in 2011.86
The case arose from the NFL’s desire to allow each team to carry six
developmental squad players in addition to the players on its regular
roster.87 These rookie and second-year players would practice and play
in only limited circumstances.88 The NFLPA wanted the developmental
squad players to have the same benefits and protections as full-fledged,
regular-roster players, including the ability to individually negotiate
salaries with teams.89 The NFL and NFLPA attempted to negotiate terms
regarding the developmental squad players but reached an impasse after
two months.90 The NFL owners then unilaterally instituted a
developmental squad program, under which each player would sign a
uniform contract and earn $1000 a week.91 A year later, 235 former

83. 518 U.S. 231, 233 (1996) (“This question in this case arises at the intersection of the Nation’s
labor and antitrust laws.”).
84. Id. at 233–34. The Court made clear that it would give the players and owners no special
treatment under the country’s labor laws. See id. at 249 (“[I]t would be odd to fashion an antitrust
exemption that gave additional advantages to professional football players . . . that transport
workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy.”).
85. Id. at 250.
86. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 21–23, 27–30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at
1, 17–21 (discussion of nonstatutory labor exemption defense).
87. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 235.
91. Id.
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developmental squad players brought an antitrust suit against the
owners.92
The Court considered whether the nonstatutory labor exemption
protected the NFL owners in a situation where they bargained to
impasse, then imposed their last, best offer.93 The Court noted that
stalled bargaining is far from the end of bargaining, describing impasse
as a “recurring feature” in negotiations.94 The majority further termed
“impasse” as a “temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations.”95 In
almost all cases, the Court added, both sides will break an impasse,
“through either a change in mind or the application of economic
force.”96
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer offered background
for the Court’s interpretation of the nonstatutory labor exemption.97 The
Court infers the exemption from federal labor law and the preference for
free and private collective bargaining, which requires good-faith
bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions.98 The exemption
is a counterpart to federal labor law’s protections for unions and labor
organizations from antitrust liability; it extends similar protections to
multiemployer units.99 The nonstatutory labor exemption is consistent
with Congress’ desire to “prevent judicial use of antitrust law to resolve
labor disputes.”100 In the Court’s view, the nonstatutory labor exemption
protects employer conduct that (1) took place during and immediately
after collective-bargaining negotiations; (2) grew out of, and was
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process; (3)
involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively;
and (4) concerned only the parties to the collective bargaining

92. Id.
93. Id. at 234.
94. Id. at 245 (citing Bonanno Linen Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 245–46. The Court also described impasse and the implementation of proposals as an
“integral part of the bargaining process.” Id. at 239. And the Court additionally noted that impasse
may be a tactic brought on deliberately by one of the parties for “strategic purposes” during the
bargaining process. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 235–38.
98. Id. at 236.
99. Id. at 237 (“[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and
employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or
with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the
process work or its results mutually acceptable.”) (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 236.
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relationship.101
In particular, the Court noted that the NFL owners faced a no-win
situation if the nonstatutory labor exemption did not protect their
imposition of terms:102
If the antitrust laws apply, what are employers to do once
impasse is reached? If all impose terms similar to their last joint
offer, they invite an antitrust action premised upon identical
behavior . . . as tending to show a common understanding or
agreement. If any, or all, of them individually impose terms that
differ significantly from that offer, they invite an unfair labor
practice charge . . . . All this is to say that to permit antitrust
liability here threatens to introduce instability and uncertainty
into the collective-bargaining process, for antitrust law often
forbids or discourages the kinds of joint discussions and
behavior that the collective-bargaining process invites or
requires.103
The Court additionally expressed concern about terminating the
exemption at the point of impasse because such a rule “creates an
exemption that can evaporate in the middle of the bargaining process.”104
Most significantly for the NFL and NBA players in 2011, the Court
held that the exemption would not indefinitely shield employers’
conduct.105 The Court stated that an agreement between employers could
be “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances” from collective
bargaining such that subjecting employers to antitrust liability would not
“significantly interfere” with the bargaining process.106 As such, the
Court suggested that the exemption would last until the “collapse of the
collective bargaining relationship.”107 A union’s decertification is an
example of such a collapse.108
The Court cited the D.C. Circuit’s Brown decision109 in endorsing
decertification as one possible boundary between collective bargaining

101. Id. at 250.
102. Id. at 241–42.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 246.
105. Id. at 250 (“Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint
imposition of terms by employers . . . .”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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protections and antitrust liability.110 The D.C. Circuit had held that
workers must choose between invoking the protections of labor law or
the Sherman Act.111 Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote, “If employees
wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego
unionization or even decertify their unions.”112 But employees could not
take advantage of the many federal labor law protections Judge Edwards
cited—including enhanced bargaining power as a union, the
establishment of mandatory subjects of bargaining, protection of the
right to strike, and ability to bring an unfair labor practice charge before
the NLRB—while also pursuing antitrust litigation.113 Judge Edwards
further noted that the NFL players previously had chosen to dissolve
their union in successfully bringing an antitrust suit against NFL owners
in 1991.114 By opting to remain a union, Judge Edwards concluded that
the players would win concessions not through antitrust suits, but with
“shrewd bargaining, favorable grievance settlements, victories in
arbitration, and, when necessary, by striking.”115
The Supreme Court did not adopt Judge Edwards’ reasoning or
language beyond simply approving that decertification could mark one
possible boundary for the exemption.116 The Court added that another
boundary could be an “extremely long” impasse marked by “instability”
or “defunctness” of the employer unit.117 Either way, the Court described
both decertification and a protracted impasse as “extreme outer
boundaries” where the nonstatutory labor exemption might no longer
protect employers from antitrust liability.118 But the Court expressly
declined to decide “whether, or where, within” such boundaries to draw
the line between collective bargaining protections and antitrust
liability.119 The Court added that it would be inappropriate to do so
without the “detailed views” of the NLRB.120 As far as a disclaimer of
110. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
111. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, 883 (1991)).
115. Id.
116. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996).
117. Id. at 250 (citing El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006–07 (1995), 1995
WL 152166).
118. Id.
119. Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within these extreme outer
boundaries to draw that line.”).
120. Id. (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 96
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representation, the Court never addressed whether such action would
mark an “extreme outer boundary” of collective bargaining allowing
employees to bring an antitrust suit.121
IV. ALTHOUGH DISCLAIMER AND DECERTIFICATION BOTH
FUNCTIONALLY DISSOLVE A UNION, IMPORTANT
DISTINCTIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO
In 2011, the NFL and NBA players chose between two
mechanisms—decertification and disclaimer of representation—to
dissolve their unions before bringing their antitrust suits.122 This Part
addresses the difference between decertification and disclaimer, as well
as two significant NLRB rulings on the effectiveness of disclaimers.
Although both mechanisms serve to end a union’s representation of
employees, important distinctions exist between the two.123
Decertification is statutorily defined by the National Labor Relations Act
and managed by the NLRB; a group of employees can call for a
decertification election by submitting a petition to the NLRB signed by
thirty percent of union members.124 The NLRB then schedules an
election, typically within a month or two of the submission of the
petition.125 If a majority of members vote for decertification, then the
union ceases to represent the employees.126 Most significantly, once a
union decertifies, it cannot re-form for twelve months.127
A disclaimer of representation, by contrast, has none of the formality
of a decertification election.128 The union leadership—which for the
(1957)).
121. Id. Judge Edwards’ decision for the D.C. Circuit in Brown seemingly endorsed a disclaimer
as being sufficient. Judge Edwards noted the NFLPA’s dissolution in Powell v. Nat’l Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), which was accomplished through a disclaimer, as well as
the ability of workers to “forego unionization or even decertify their unions.” See Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
122. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 nn.196–98 (2012).
123. Id.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006).
125. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 n.197; see also Gabriel A. Feldman, The Issues Behind
the NBA Players’ Decertification Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011 8:27 a.m.),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/the-legal-issues-behind-t_2_b_1081107.html
(noting that uncontested decertification elections can take place within thirty days of verification of
petitions; an election might take place within forty-five to sixty days for a complex decertification
such as the NBA players’).
126. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 n.197.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 159.
128. As the NFL owners described it in their appeal to the Eighth Circuit, “Lacking the formality
of decertification—an employee-driven process supervised by the NLRB that includes a vote by
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NFLPA and NBPA included an executive committee of current
players—renounces its interest in representing its workers in collective
bargaining.129 Disclaimer requires no petition, vote, or recognition
involving the NLRB, and the union’s role as the worker’s bargaining
representative terminates immediately.130
Whether through decertification or disclaimer of representation,
employees forfeit important labor rights by dissolving their unions.131
They lose the right to strike and the ability to bring an NLRB action
against employers for failing to bargain in good faith.132 For the football
players in 2011, the NFL considered unilaterally imposing an enhanced
drug-testing program after the union dissolved.133 Previously, the NFL
owners unilaterally lengthened the league’s season to seventeen games
and cut insurance benefits after the union disclaimed representation in
1989.134
But the instantaneous termination of representation through a
disclaimer raises concerns about its potential tactical use. In its briefs,
the NFL argued that “[d]isclaimer, unlike decertification, can be undone
as quickly as it is asserted.”135 The league’s chief concern was that a
disclaimer can be “manipulated by the parties for bargaining purposes,”
particularly if a court views it as a boundary between collective
bargaining protections and antitrust liability.136 The NFL added that
courts should defer to the NLRB in determining whether a disclaimer is
valid or whether it is “simply a sham” not to be recognized.137

secret ballot—disclaimer is literally a paper-thin statement, issued unilaterally by a union.” Opening
Brief of Appellants at 46, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 0:11cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2003085.
129. See Feldman supra note 59, at 1256 n.197 (“A disclaimer of interest occurs when a showing
has been made that more than 50% of the employees in the union do not wish to be represented by
the union.”); see also Feldman, supra note 125, The Issues Behind the NBA Players’ Decertification
Strategy, (“Disclaimer is a less complicated process that could happen immediately—the union
must simply renounce its interest in representing the employees in collective bargaining.”).
130. See supra note 129.
131. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018 (D. Minn. 2011).
132. Id. at 1001 (citing Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn.
1991)).
133. Judy Battista, N.F.L. Considers Forcing New Testing Standards, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011,
at D2.
134. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (citing Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1359).
135. Reply Brief of Appellants at 32, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir.
2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417.
136. Id.
137. Opening Brief of Appellants at 35, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG),
2011 WL 1750480.
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Both the NFL owners and players cited a June 1991 NLRB advisory
opinion that a previous disclaimer by the NFLPA was valid.138 In that
advisory opinion (In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc.139), the NLRB
expressed that the NFLPA’s disclaimer was effective because it was
“unequivocal, made in good faith, and unaccompanied by any
inconsistent conduct.”140 The opinion called a decertification election
“an unnecessary waste of time and resources” for a union that already
has made a valid disclaimer.141 The opinion also addressed the NFL’s
contention that the union’s disclaimer was motivated by litigation
strategy.142 The fact that the players were attempting to deny owners a
defense to antitrust liability was “irrelevant” in the NLRB’s view as long
as the disclaimer “is otherwise unequivocal and adhered to.”143
The Pittsburgh Steelers ruling, however, is not the NLRB’s only word
on the subject of disclaimers. In a 1958 case involving a group of
workers bargaining with an association of department stores, the NLRB
noted that a disclaimer must mark a “sincere abandonment, with relative
permanency” of bargaining.144 The NLRB focused on the workers’
continued picketing as inconsistent behavior with having disclaimed
representation as a union.145 The NLRB concluded that the workers’
“bare statement of disclaimer” was not enough “if the surrounding
circumstances justify an inference to the contrary.”146 The NLRB
described the union’s disclaimer as “a measure of momentary
expedience, or strategy in bargaining.”147 In a 1964 case, the NLRB
further declared that it was not compelled to recognize a disclaimer “just
because the union uses the word,” while ignoring contrary
circumstances.148 “The question must be decided in each case whether
the union has in truth disclaimed, or whether its alleged disclaimer is
138. In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *1 (June 26, 1991).
139. Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468.
140. Id. at *2 n.8. Robert E. Allen, the NLRB’s associate general counsel, authored the advisory
opinion in response to a regional director’s request for advice. Id. at *1, *4. The NLRB’s Office of
General Counsel responds to requests for advice from any of the agency’s regional directors by
issuing a final determination through an advice memorandum. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League,
779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1016 n.25 (D. Minn. 2011).
141. Pittsburgh Steelers, 1991 WL 144468, at *2 n.8.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (Apr. 11, 1958), 1958 WL 13328.
145. Id. at 392–93.
146. Id. at 392.
147. Id. at 394.
148. Capitol Market No. 1, 145 N.L.R.B. 1430, 1431 (Jan. 1, 1964), 1964 WL 16218.
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simply a sham and for that reason not to be given force and effect.”149
The NFL owners looked to the 1958 NLRB ruling in arguing in 2011
that the players’ disclaimer was not a “sincere abandonment” of
bargaining.150 A U.S. District Court judge in Minnesota found that the
NFL players validly disclaimed their union, citing the NLRB’s
Pittsburgh Steelers ruling and rejecting the owners’ argument that the
court needed to defer to the NLRB on the issue.151 The Eighth Circuit,
however, ultimately did not resolve the question on appeal.152
V.

IN 1991, THE NFL PLAYERS DISSOLVED THEIR UNION
WITH A DISCLAIMER RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S.
DISTRICT COURT IN MINNESOTA

The acrimonious history between the NFL players and owners shaped
their labor battle in 2011. They have had what the Eighth Circuit
described in 1989 as an “often tempestuous relationship” going back
decades.153 Before the players opted in 2011 to dissolve their union and
bring antitrust suits, the two sides litigated over free agency in 1989 and
1991—cases that also concerned a disclaimer’s effectiveness.154 Those
cases served as important precedent when the owners and players
returned to court in 2011.155
In 1991, U.S. District Court Judge David Doty in Minnesota found
that a group of players could bring an antitrust suit against the owners.156
This followed the NFLPA’s decision to disclaim interest in serving as
the players’ bargaining representative in the wake of an Eighth Circuit
decision in 1989.157 Judge Doty found that the union had ceased to
engage in collective bargaining dating to November 1989—some

149. Id. at 1432.
150. Reply Brief of Appellants at 26, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir.
2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417.
151. See infra notes 197–203.
152. See Brady, 644 F.3d at 682.
153. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989).
154. See id.; Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
155. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779
F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11–639), 2011 WL 958695.
156. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1359 (“Because no ‘ongoing collective bargaining relationship’
exists, the court determines that nonstatutory labor exemption has ended.”). The decision was
reported as Powell v. National Football League, but Judge Doty notes in a later decision that it
should have been reported as McNeil v. National Football League given the motions that were
decided. See McNeil, 777 F. Supp. 1475, 1478 n.1 (D. Minn. 1991).
157. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1354, 1356.
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eighteen months before his decision.158 He ruled that the NFL owners
were not forever exempt from antitrust laws and that the nonstatutory
labor exemption would not apply “if the affected employees ceased to be
represented by a certified union.”159 That had happened with the NFL
players, leading Judge Doty to deny the owners’ motion for summary
judgment.160 After later losing at trial, the NFL owners settled with the
players, agreeing upon a deal that included a new collective bargaining
agreement giving players greater rights as free agents to sign with new
teams.161 The union also re-formed at the owners’ request.162
Two years earlier, in 1989, the Eighth Circuit set the stage for Judge
Doty’s ruling by holding that the players had to choose between
continued bargaining or antitrust litigation.163 Although the owners and
players had reached an impasse in bargaining, the court emphasized the
economic and legal tools both sides still had to resolve the dispute.164
The union could strike, the owners could lock out the players, and both
could petition the NLRB, charging the other with unfair labor
practices.165 But to allow the players to bring an antitrust suit as a union
at impasse would “improperly upset the careful balance established by
Congress through the labor law.”166 The court concluded by reviewing
the choices facing the owners and players.167 The two sides could
continue bargaining, which the court “strongly urge[d]” them to do.168
They could resort to economic force or present claims to the NLRB.169
But as long as either side could bring claims before the NLRB, or until
158. Id. at 1358. Judge Doty issued his decision on May 23, 1991. Id. at 1351.
159. Id. at 1356, 1358 (“The Powell court . . . expressly rejected the idea that the NFL defendants
enjoy endless antitrust immunity.”).
160. Id. at 1358–59.
161. See White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (D. Minn. 1993); McNeil v.
Nat’l Football League, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. 1992) (special verdict
form). A jury awarded $543,000 in damages, which the court then trebled. The parties settled the
litigation before the District Court entered final judgment in McNeil. Id.
162. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1398; McNeil, 1992 WL 315292, at *1.
163. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1301–02 (8th Cir. 1989). In her
decision in Brady, Judge Susan Richard Nelson described the Eighth Circuit’s Powell holding as
requiring the NFLPA to “jettison[] the entire collective bargaining apparatus—and the rights and
benefits it provided to them” before bringing Sherman Act claims against the owners. Brady v. Nat’l
Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (D. Minn. 2011).
164. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1303–04.
168. Id. at 1303.
169. Id.
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those claims were resolved, the court held that the labor relationship
between the owners and players continued and the nonstatutory labor
exemption extended to shield the owners from antitrust liability.170
Following the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the NFLPA’s executive
committee voted to disclaim representation.171 The NFLPA notified NFL
management of the decision, and a “substantial majority” of players
signed petitions in the following weeks stating that neither the NFLPA
nor any other entity was entitled to act as their bargaining
representative.172 A month after the executive committee’s decision,
player representatives from each team unanimously voted to end the
NFLPA’s status as their bargaining representative and to restructure the
organization.173 Judge Doty later recounted these steps the players
undertook in executing the disclaimer.174
In his decision, Judge Doty expressed that the majority will of
employees is what defines the bargaining relationship.175 Under Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act, employees have an unconditional
right not to unionize and not to engage in collective bargaining.176
Because certification is not required to create a collective bargaining
relationship, Judge Doty reasoned that decertification is not required to
end it.177 Judge Doty thus found it unnecessary for the NLRB to
decertify the union and allowed the players’ antitrust claims to go
forward.178
The NFL players would look to the cases from 1989 and 1991 in their
2011 fight with owners.

170. Id. at 1303–04. In an interesting footnote, the court addressed the NFL’s legal concessions,
one of which was that owners could face liability under the Sherman Act if the players ceased to be
represented by a certified union. Id. at 1303 n.12.
171. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991).
172. Id. at 1354 & n.1.
173. Id. at 1354.
174. Id. at 1354, 1356.
175. Id. at 1357.
176. Id. at 1358.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1358–59 (“The NFLPA also concedes that it has lost its majority status and may no
longer bargain on the players’ behalf. Thus, there is no need for the NLRB to decertify the
NFLPA.”). In a footnote, Judge Doty cited NLRB guidelines requiring no decertification election in
cases where a union no longer wishes to continue as a bargaining representative. Id. at 1358 n.7.
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VI. THE NFL PLAYERS IN 2011 INITIALLY WON A
FAVORABLE RULING REGARDING THE DISCLAIMER,
BUT THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ULTIMATELY LEFT THE ISSUE
UNRESOLVED
After the NFLPA disclaimed representation and the players filed their
antitrust suit in 2011, the players won a favorable ruling in U.S. District
Court in Minnesota when Judge Susan Richard Nelson enjoined the
lockout.179 The Eighth Circuit later reversed that decision, holding that
the injunction violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits courts
from issuing injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes.180
However, the Eighth Circuit did not rule on the disclaimer’s
effectiveness or the merits of the players’ antitrust claims, leaving
unanswered the question of whether the disclaimer would constitute an
“extreme outer boundary” of the collective bargaining relationship and
nonstatutory labor exemption.181
Unlike their battles in the 1990s over free agency, the NFL owners
and players clashed in 2011 over the split of revenues.182 The owners
wanted a greater share of the league’s $9 billion in annual revenues—
players previously received 59.5% of revenues, after deducting the first
$1 billion as cost credits for league expenses.183 The owners also sought
a rookie wage scale and longer season.184 The owners and players
unsuccessfully bargained for sixteen days with federal mediator George
Cohen prior to expiration of the CBA.185 Then, with the CBA only hours
away from expiring, the NFLPA dissolved effective at 4 p.m. on March
11, 2011.186 This was accomplished through a disclaimer of
representation: the player representatives from the league’s thirty-two
teams voted to approve the disclaimer.187 Declaring itself no longer the
players’ bargaining representative, the NFLPA reclassified as a
179. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042–43 (D. Minn. 2011).
180. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
181. Id. at 682; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
182. See Judy Battista, In Labor Clash, N.F.L.’s Union Calls Old Play, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2011, at A1.
183. See Jarrett Bell, The Last Game Until? A Looming Lockout by NFL Owners Could Put the
2011 Season on Hold, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2011, at A1.
184. Drape, supra note 45.
185. See Battista, supra note 43.
186. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
5, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRNJJG), 2011 WL 956159.
187. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 22.
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professional association with the Department of Labor and Internal
Revenue Service.188 The timing of the disclaimer was critical: the
existing CBA barred the players from bringing an antitrust suit for six
months once it expired.189
That same day, ten players filed a class-action antitrust suit in U.S.
District Court in Minnesota, while the NFL owners locked out players
effective at midnight.190 The owners argued that the NFLPA’s disclaimer
was invalid and the nonstatutory labor exemption still protected their
conduct.191 Further, the owners emphasized that the disclaimer occurred
“literally during” a bargaining session.192 The owners argued that the
players’ “tactical and unilateral” decision to disclaim representation
could not “instantaneously oust” federal labor law and the owners’ labor
law rights.193 The owners argued: “A union cannot, by a tactical decision
akin to the flip of a switch, transform a multiemployer bargaining unit’s
lawful use of economic tools afforded it under the labor law into an
antitrust violation” with treble damages and injunctive relief.194 The
owners also contended that the NLRB would find the players’ disclaimer
was not made in good faith and instead was employed for “momentary
expedienc[y].”195 Notably, the owners used the players’ media
comments against them, quoting players who suggested that the union
would continue functioning even after purportedly being dissolved.196

188. See Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04. During negotiations, the NFLPA received
conditional approval from players to disclaim interest in collective bargaining if union leadership
later found it was advantageous to do so. See also Opening Brief of Appellants at 6–7, Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898). Executive director DeMaurice
Smith asked for authority to dissolve the union in the fall. See Battista, supra note 182. The NFL
argued that the players submitted no voting cards or other written documentation authorizing the
disclaimer prior to the CBA’s expiration. See Brief of Appellants at 7 n.4, Brady v. Nat’l Football
League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898).
189. See Feldman, The Issues Behind the NBA Players’ Decertification Strategy, supra note 125.
The NFL owners in their previous settlement also agreed not to challenge the players’ right to
dissolve the union and pursue antitrust remedies if the players agreed to reform the union for a new
CBA. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19.
190. The players’ chief antitrust complaints related to the NFL’s salary cap and college draft as
well as its franchise player designations imposing restrictions on player free agency. See Brady
Complaint, supra note 1, at 24–27.
191. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
9, Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 11CV00639), 2011 WL 956159.
192. See id. (emphasis in original).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 21 (quoting Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1955)).
196. Id. at 16. One player said the disclaimer was a “good decision and a good strategy on our
part as a union.” Id. Another said the purpose of disclaimer was to have an “ace up our sleeve.” Id.
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A month after the players’ suit, Judge Nelson issued an injunction
halting the lockout after finding the players’ disclaimer effectively
terminated the collective bargaining relationship.197 In particular, Judge
Nelson rejected the owners’ argument that the court needed to defer to
the NLRB in determining whether the disclaimer was effective.198 She
echoed Judge Doty in finding that decertification was not required to end
a bargaining relationship and cited the NLRB’s “numerous opinions”
over the years addressing disclaimers.199 Judge Nelson ruled that the
players’ disclaimer was unequivocal, made in good faith, and
unaccompanied by inconsistent conduct.200 Judge Nelson noted that “no
legal support” existed for the requirement that a disclaimer be a
permanent abandonment of collective bargaining, adding, “[e]mployees
have the right not only to organize as a union but also to refrain from
such representation and, as relevant here, to ‘de-unionize.’”201 Because
the players gave up “significant rights” by disclaiming, Judge Nelson
found that “any subjective motivation” regarding the disclaimer was
irrelevant.202 This was consistent with the NLRB’s standard from its
1991 Pittsburgh Steelers advisory opinion for evaluating disclaimers.203
With the players having disclaimed representation, Judge Nelson
found that the collective bargaining relationship had ended entirely.204
She distinguished the present circumstances with those in Brown in
which the owners and players had reached impasse.205 The NFLPA’s
dissolution provided a “clear boundary” marking the end of collective
bargaining.206 “There is no need to wait and see if any temporary
impasse will be surmounted or prove intractable,” Judge Nelson

at 15. Derrick Mason, another football player, said the players were “per se, no,” not a union, “but
we’re still going to act as one” and would “try to as a whole get a deal done.” Id. at 16.
197. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1042–43.
198. Id. at 1021–22.
199. Id. at 1014–15.
200. Id. at 1022.
201. Id. at 1015.
202. Id. at 1018.
203. Id. at 1015–19; see also In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL
144468, at *1, *4 n.8 (June 26, 1991).
204. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1021–22 (“[U]nlike impasse—which occurs within the collective
bargaining process of negotiations, but frequently amounts to nothing more than a ‘timeout’—such
a disclaimer removes the dispute from the collective bargaining framework.”).
205. Id. at 1040 (“Brown concerned an impasse occurring within the context of a collective
bargaining relationship that likely could continue. Here, in contrast, the parties have left the
collective bargaining framework entirely.”).
206. Id. at 1020.
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wrote.207 The players’ disclaimer triggered a “definitive and immediate”
renunciation of collective bargaining and labor law protections.208 Judge
Nelson lastly found “nothing inherently unfair or inequitable” with the
players’ disclaimer instantaneously ending the bargaining relationship,
noting that the players lost significant rights and faced similar
consequences from their decision.209
Judge Nelson went on to find that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
prohibit the court from issuing an injunction halting the lockout because
the collective bargaining relationship between the owners and players no
longer existed.210 As for the players’ antitrust claims, Judge Nelson
suggested that the players’ disclaimer left the owners exposed to
liability.211
The owners appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing again that the
union’s disclaimer was tactical and the nonstatutory labor exemption
continued to offer antitrust protection, as well as contending that the
District Court should have deferred to the NLRB.212 The owners asserted
that “no student of the history of this industry” could believe that the
players had abandoned the union.213 The owners cited Brown in arguing
that the disclaimer must be sufficiently distant in time and circumstances
from bargaining for the exemption to cease.214 The owners argued: “In
the context of multiemployer bargaining, the mere potential for antitrust
scrutiny, activated at an unpredictable time by unilateral decision of the
potential antitrust plaintiffs across the bargaining table, would frustrate
federal labor law by inhibiting collective action and robust negotiations
throughout the bargaining process.”215 Their final argument concerned
Judge Nelson’s authority to issue an injunction under the NorrisLaGuardia Act because the issues grew out of a labor dispute.216 Four
207. Id. at 1021.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1042–43.
211. Id. at 1040 (“Although it remains to be decided whether the nonstatutory labor exemption
still applies to protect the League from antitrust claims regarding player restraints, it is clear that the
holding of Brown, which is confined to impasse, offers no absolute shield against such claims.”).
212. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 22, 26–27, 29–35, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d
661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417.
213. Id. at 22.
214. Id. at 32.
215. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 45, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG),
2011 WL 2003085 (emphasis in original).
216. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 2–6, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG),
2011 WL 2179417.
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days after Judge Nelson’s decision, the Eighth Circuit granted a
temporary stay of the injunction pending appeal.217
Three weeks later, the Eighth Circuit granted a full stay pending
appeal of Judge Nelson’s injunction, expressing skepticism about her
interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.218 In a 2-1 decision, the court
held that it could not reconcile the timing of the players’ suit with Judge
Nelson’s finding that the case did not arise or grow out of a labor dispute
and that Norris-LaGuardia therefore did not apply.219 Following the
decision, the NFL called on players to resume negotiations and “control
their own destiny” on a new CBA.220
After granting the stay pending appeal in May, the Eighth Circuit
heard oral arguments in June and reversed Judge Nelson’s decision.221
Arguing for the owners, former Solicitor General Paul Clement notably
claimed that the exemption should extend for at least a year after a union
dissolves.222 The same Eighth Circuit panel split 2-1 and again rejected
Judge Nelson’s interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.223 The court
held that the case arose from a labor dispute, noting that the players and
owners were parties to a CBA for more than eighteen years and had
bargained for more than two years before the players’ suit.224 The court
also noted that the NFLPA disclaimed and players filed suit in a single
day.225 Judge Steven Colloton wrote for the majority: “The labor dispute
217. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2011).
218. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789–91 (8th Cir. 2011).
219. Id. The court held that given the “close temporal and substantive relationship” between the
players’ suit and the league’s labor dispute, “we struggle at this juncture to see why this case is not
at least one ‘growing out of a labor dispute.’” Id. at 791–92.
220. See Judy Battista, Owners Win Delay in Lockout Case, Keeping N.F.L. Shut, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2011, at B16.
221. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663; see Judy Battista, Judge Advises N.F.L. and Players to Continue
Efforts to End Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, at D6. Judge Bye told the lawyers arguing the
case, “We won’t . . . be all that hurt that you’re leaving us out if you should go out and settle the
case.” Id.
222. Id. (“Clement also said the nonstatutory labor exemption should apply for at least a business
cycle after a union dissolves itself—meaning the lockout would not be subject to antitrust law for at
least a year—and he called antitrust charges made by players ‘extraneous.’”). Judge Bye noted in
his dissent that the NFL advocated for the exemption to continue for a year or one business cycle
following the union’s dissolution. Brady, 644 F.3d at 687 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“At some point in
the ‘arising out of’ spectrum, the antitrust immunities stemming from statutory and nonstatutory
labor exemptions must come to an end and give way to antitrust remedies. Such point does not
come a year from the union disclaimer, nor one business cycle from it, as suggested by the League’s
counsel. Rather, such point comes at the moment of the union disclaimer.”).
223. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663, 673.
224. Id. at 673.
225. Id.
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did not suddenly disappear just because the Players elected to pursue the
dispute through antitrust litigation rather than collective bargaining.”226
However, the Eighth Circuit did not rule on whether the exemption
continued to apply following the players’ disclaimer.227 With the case
continuing no further, the Eighth Circuit’s decision left all issues
regarding the effectiveness of a disclaimer of representation and the
exemption’s boundaries unresolved.228
Even as they awaited the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, the NFL owners and
players resumed bargaining.229 They reached agreement on a new CBA
in time to play a full season, cancelling only an annual preseason
game.230 Players received forty-seven percent of all revenues, with most
cost-credit deductions for owners eliminated.231 Owners agreed to
shorten off-season training programs and reduce practice time during the
preseason and regular season.232 To approve the new CBA following
their disclaimer, the players voted to reconstitute the union and then
approved the CBA.233
Although the NBA players similarly dissolved their union through a
disclaimer, they did so only after months of unsuccessful bargaining
following imposition of the lockout.234 With players and owners
reaching agreement on a new CBA two weeks after the disclaimer (and
with the clock ticking on their season), no court issued a comparable
ruling in the NBA lockout as in the NFL lockout.235

226. Id.
227. Id. at 682 (“In particular, we express no view on whether the League’s nonstatutory labor
exemption from the antitrust laws continues after the union’s disclaimer.”).
228. Id.
229. See Judy Battista, N.F.L. Set to Proceed Toward Deal with Players, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2011, at B12.
230. See Battista, supra notes 41, 49.
231. See Ken Belson, With Lockout Over, One Jet is Left to Explain It To His Teammates, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at B10. The owners sought cost-credit deductions for business expenses
including stadium enhancements, running the NFL television network, promotional activities, and
overseas marketing. See Battista, supra note 43; Tom Pedulla, The NFL’s Labor Dispute: Answers
to Key Questions, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2011.
232. See supra note 231.
233. See Judy Battista, Owners Vote in Favor of Tentative Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2011, at B11. The NFLPA wanted to collect union cards from players before re-forming to bolster
its contention that the dissolution was not a sham to gain bargaining leverage. This was important in
the event the union’s legitimacy was challenged in future negotiations. Id.
234. See infra Part VII.
235. See infra Part VII.
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VII. THE NBA PLAYERS REFRAINED FROM DISSOLVING
THEIR UNION FOR MONTHS BEFORE THE LOCKOUT WAS
QUICKLY RESOLVED FOLLOWING THEIR DISCLAIMER
The NBA owners’ commitment to a “fundamental overhaul” of
league economics marked the beginning of the basketball lockout.236
Owners claimed that twenty-two of the league’s thirty teams were losing
money and that those losses amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.237 Billions of dollars separated the owners’ and the players’
proposals when the CBA expired on July 1, 2011, and the owners
imposed a lockout.238 Unlike the NFL players, however, the NBA
players negotiated with the team owners on a new CBA for nearly fourand-a-half months following the lockout before dissolving their union
and filing antitrust suits.239 From the start of the lockout, NBPA officials
viewed dissolving the union as a last-ditch option and pledged to
continue negotiating with owners.240 But as months passed with no
resolution, the NBPA faced mounting pressure to decertify or disclaim
representation, driven by several prominent players’ agents.241
The owners and players engaged in months of bruising negotiations,
marked by the repeated breakdown of talks, and finally culminating in a
take-it-or-leave-it offer that NBA Commissioner David Stern issued in

236. See Beck, supra note 2.
237. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43. The owners sought not only an increased share of revenues, but
also restrictions on player movement as free agents, shorter contracts, a tougher salary cap, and
lower salaries. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43.
238. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43; Mahoney, supra note 44. NBA Commissioner David Stern
said: “We had a great year in terms of the appreciation of our fans for our game. It just wasn’t a
profitable one for the owners, and it wasn’t one that many of the smaller market teams particularly
enjoyed or felt included in.” Mahoney, supra note 44.
239. See Beck, supra note 16 (“The N.F.L. players dissolved their union before their labor deal
had expired. The N.B.A. players have been trying to negotiate a new deal for more than four
months, and did not disband their union until the league ostensibly stopped negotiating.”).
240. Beck, supra note 43. NBPA executive director Billy Hunter’s pledged to continue to
negotiate; “That was sort of the closing agreement up there, that we would not let the imposition of
a lockout stop us from meeting.” Id.
241. See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Union Faces Test of Strength, YAHOO.COM, Sept. 14, 2011,
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nba-union-faces-test-strength-074200148—nba.html. Agents viewed
the prospect of an unfavorable court ruling as the only way to win concessions from owners. Adrian
Wojnarowski, Agents Pushing for Clear Union Strategy, YAHOO.COM, Sept. 7, 2011,
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/agents-pushing-clear-union-strategy-185200144—nba.html; Adrian
Wojnarowski, NBA Agents Want Union to Decertify, YAHOO.COM, July 23, 2011,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_agents_decertification_072311
(quoting a prominent agent as saying, “We have one weapon left, and that’s decertification. We
need to use it,”).
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November.242 Either the players could accept a proposed 50/50 split of
revenues or Stern promised the owners’ next “reset” offer would include
a 53/47 split of revenues in the owners’ favor, along with a hard salary
cap and shorter contracts.243 The 50/50 split amounted to a $3 billion
giveback by players in a potential ten-year CBA.244 After the players
rejected the proposal, the NBPA resorted to its last-ditch option and
disclaimed interest in continuing to represent the players in
bargaining.245 By then, Stern had canceled the season’s first month of
games.246 Now facing the possibility of a lost season, Stern described the
players’ decision as sending the NBA into a “nuclear winter” of
uncertainty.247 A lost season would have cost the players and owners an
estimated $2 billion collectively for each side.248
Once they opted to dissolve their union, the NBA players mirrored the
NFL players’ actions. The NBPA disclaimed representation and a group
of players filed antitrust suits the following day.249 One group of players
brought suit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
while another group did so in U.S. District Court in Minnesota, where
the NFL players had won a favorable ruling from Judge Nelson only
months earlier.250 The players charged that as early as 2007, Stern and
242. See Howard Beck, A Final Proposal, with Hopes of a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at
B15. After meeting with owners and players for thirty hours over three days in October, federal
mediator George Cohen walked away from the talks saying, “No useful purpose would be served by
requesting the parties to continue the mediation process at this time.” Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks
Break Off, Threatening November Games, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at B16. That same day,
NBPA executive director Billy Hunter claimed that the NBA had planned for two or three years to
lock out the players, break the union, and impose a new economic system. Id.
243. See Beck, supra note 242; Howard Beck, Facing Deadline, Players Committee Will Confer,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at D4.
244. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Negotiations Resume, with Possible Breakthrough, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2011, at B13.
245. See Beck, supra notes 16, 19.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See Howard Beck, Long Shot by Players is a Nudge Toward Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2011, at B18.
249. See Class Action Complaint at 15–16, Butler v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, No. 011-cv-03352PJS-SER (D. Minn. filed Nov. 15, 2011); see also Howard Beck, In Attempt to Force Talks, Players
File Antitrust Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at B15; Beck, supra note 16. The player
representatives from the NBA’s thirty teams voted unanimously for the NBPA to disclaim its role as
the players’ bargaining representative. According to the players, a substantial majority of players
previously signed authorization cards empowering the NBPA to disclaim representation if
unionization no longer was in the players’ best interests. The NBPA converted to a trade association
and started the process of reclassifying with the Department of Labor and the IRS.
250. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Butler, No. 011-cv-03352-PJS-SER; Anthony Complaint,
supra note 1, at 1; Beck, supra note 249.
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Deputy Commissioner Adam Silver met with NBPA Executive Director
Billy Hunter and informed Hunter that the owners were “prepared to
lock out the players for two years to get everything” they wanted in a
new CBA.251 The players added that Stern promised a potential deal
would only get worse during the lockout.252 The players also asserted
that the league wanted to guarantee owners a ten percent profit annually,
regardless of whether their teams succeeded on the basketball court.253
In anticipation of the players’ suit, the NBA preemptively sued the
NBPA in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
August 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment that any disclaimer would
be ineffective.254 The owners claimed that the NBPA had threatened to
disclaim dozens of times and bring antitrust litigation in every CBA
negotiation dating to 1970.255 The owners argued: “[D]espite the
NBPA’s repeated invocation of the antitrust laws in an effort to gain
leverage in bargaining, the ultimate resolution on each such occasion . . .
has always been the same: a collectively-bargained agreement between
the NBA and NBPA negotiated pursuant to federal labor law containing
the very practices the NBPA had challenged as antitrust violations.”256
The NBA called the threatened disclaimer “an impermissible negotiating
tactic” and not a “good faith, permanent relinquishment” of bargaining
rights.257 The NBA sought a declaratory judgment that its lockout was
legal and that the nonstatutory labor exemption protected owners from
antitrust liability.258 Conversely, the NBA requested that if the court
found the disclaimer valid, it declare all contracts between players and
teams void and unenforceable as the product of a now-defunct
bargaining process.259
After more than four months of failed bargaining through the lockout,
the NBA players contended in their lawsuits that the collective
bargaining relationship had collapsed in the context of Brown.260 The
players noted that they bargained twenty-three times even before the
251. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
252. Id.
253. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
254. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l
Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 11CV05369 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3274242.
255. Id. at 10.
256. Id. at 10–11.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id. at 17–18.
259. Id. at 21.
260. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 17–19, 20–21.
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CBA expired, offered hundreds of millions of dollars in concessions, and
faced nonnegotiable demands in return from owners.261 They cited
Stern’s words accompanying his November ultimatum—“We have made
our revised proposal and we’re not planning to make another one”—as
evidence that the league had no intention of negotiating material changes
to its proposal.262 The players argued that these collective circumstances
marked the abandonment of collective bargaining by owners even before
their disclaimer.263 They further cited their own “caution and reluctance”
in disclaiming representation, noting that the NBPA had never taken
such a step since its establishment in 1954 despite facing pressure to do
so during previous negotiations.264 Unlike the NFL players, who
disclaimed following a bargaining session and on the eve of their CBA’s
expiration, the NBA players argued that their disclaimer was prompted
by months (if not years) of frustrated negotiations.265
With the clock ticking on their season, though, the NBA owners
and players resumed negotiations and resolved the lockout two weeks
after the disclaimer and start of litigation.266 The players consolidated
their suits in the days after filing, but no court heard arguments or ruled
on the issues raised.267 Following a fifteen-hour bargaining session, the
owners and players announced agreement on a new CBA at 3:40 a.m. on
November 26, 2011.268 The agreement came in time for the league to
salvage a sixty-six-game season beginning on Christmas.269 Owners
received $300 million in annual salary concessions from players, who

261. Id. at 12–13, 18.
262. Id. at 17.
263. Id. at 3–5, 17–18.
264. Id. at 17.
265. See id. at 12–17 (citing NBA owners’ intransigence in negotiations dating to June 2007).
The NBA players cited the ultimatum as evidence of the owners’ “effective destruction” of the
bargaining process in their Complaint. See id. at 4. Some commentators have argued that because
the NBA players waited months before disclaiming, a court might have been more inclined to view
their disclaimer as marking the end of the collective bargaining relationship. See Gabe Feldman,
NBA Lockout: The NBA’s Nuclear Winter—Where Do We Go From Here?, GRANTLAND.COM, Nov.
22,
2011,
http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/10276/nba-lockout-thenba%E2%80%99s-nuclear-winter-%E2%80%94-where-do-we-go-from-here (“Why did Billy
Hunter wait so long after the CBA expired to disclaim interest? . . . Maybe he though[t] the delay
would strengthen the players’ argument that the disclaimer ended the non-statutory labor
exemption.”).
266. Beck, supra notes 19, 244.
267. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Players Merge Lawsuits; No Hearing Date Set, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2011, at B18.
268. Beck, supra note 19.
269. Id.
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received 51.2 percent of revenues under the new CBA for the 2011–12
season.270 Executive Director Hunter said at the press conference
announcing the agreement, “We just thought that rather than try to
pursue this in court, it was in both of our interests to try to reach a
resolution.”271
VIII. THE NFL AND NBA LOCKOUTS SHOULD LEAVE COURTS
WARY OF RECOGNIZING FUTURE UNION DISCLAIMERS
Although the NFL and NBA lockouts left the question unanswered of
whether a union’s disclaimer of representation terminates the collective
bargaining relationship in the context of Brown, courts should be wary
of recognizing future disclaimers. The destabilizing effect of a
disclaimer on the collective bargaining process should concern courts
that previously have struggled to strike the proper balance between
encouraging bargaining while preserving the possibility of antitrust
liability.272 In the event of a disclaimer, courts have a variety of options
to consider for marking the boundary between collective bargaining
protections and antitrust liability.273 Those options include insisting on a
formal decertification by the union (despite being portrayed as
unnecessary by courts in the past);274 deferring to the NLRB in
determining whether a disclaimer is effective;275 or extending the
nonstatutory labor exemption for a reasonable period following a
disclaimer.276
This Comment argues that courts should extend the exemption for a
reasonable period following a disclaimer as the best means of separating
deserving antitrust claims from those merely used as bargaining tactics.
The NFL owners argued before the Eighth Circuit that such a reasonable
period could extend for either a year or one business cycle following a
union’s disclaimer.277 This is a reasonable standard: by applying such a
principle, courts would minimize the potentially destabilizing effect on
270. See id.; Marc Stein, Billy Hunter Sends Players Memo on BRI, ESPN.COM, Nov. 27, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7285446/billy-hunter-tells-players-get-512-percent-bri-2011-12.
271. See Beck, supra note 19.
272. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241–42 (1996).
273. See infra notes 274–76.
274. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042–43
(D. Minn. 2011); Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Minn. 1991).
275. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
276. The NFL owners advocated for the latter during arguments before the Eighth Circuit in the
Brady case. See supra note 222.
277. See supra note 222.
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the bargaining process that the Supreme Court emphasized in connection
with the impasse in Brown.278 In addition, this would allow courts to
distinguish between claims brought by plaintiffs such as the Powell
players, who pursued antitrust litigation without a union for eighteen
months, and the Brady players, who filed suit the same day as they
disclaimed representation and dissolved the union.279
A.

By Immediately Recognizing a Players’ Union’s Disclaimer,
Courts Risk Destabilizing the Bargaining Process

The prospect of destabilizing in the bargaining process that so
concerned the Court in Brown directly applies when a union is capable
of unilaterally disclaiming representation, followed by its members
immediately bringing an antitrust suit against the employer.280 The NFL
owners emphasized this potential threat to the bargaining process in their
arguments in Brady.281 In the 2011 lockouts, the NFL and NBA players
went from bargaining to antitrust litigation in a matter of hours—
whether it was prior to expiration of a CBA for the NFL players or
months into a lockout for the NBA players.282 The NFL owners noted
that the players’ legal argument for terminating the nonstatutory labor
exemption would “immediately and easily convert collective conduct
encouraged by the labor laws into conduct condemned by the antitrust
laws.”283 As a result, the NFL players’ actions are difficult to view as
sufficiently distant in time and circumstances from the bargaining
process to terminate the exemption and to expose employers to antitrust

278. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 241–42, 246.
279. See Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1358; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–23; supra note 158.
280. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 241–42, 246.
281. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 48, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“[T]he decision to engage in collective bargaining, especially
multiemployer collective bargaining, has consequences. Even if a union purports to reverse that
decision, it has no reasonable basis to assume that it can instantly and unilaterally shift the
governing legal structure to the immediate disadvantage, if not peril, of the multiemployer
bargaining unit.”).
282. As the NFL owners argued in their brief to the Eighth Circuit:
When, as in this case, an antitrust suit follows disclaimer by mere hours, when that disclaimer
is in direct response to events at the collective bargaining table and even more when there are
strong indications that the union will return and enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement, the suit cannot be said to be ‘sufficiently distant in time and circumstances’ from
the collective bargaining process unless those words have no meaning.
Opening Brief of Appellants at 48–49, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 11-1898).
283. Id. at 48 (emphasis in original).
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liability.284 Although the Court addressed a bargaining impasse in
Brown, it voiced an underlying concern about circumstances that
“threaten to introduce instability and uncertainty in the collectivebargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids or discourages the
kinds of joint discussions and behavior that the collective-bargaining
process invites or requires.”285 These are the same factors present when a
players’ union can disclaim interest and immediately file an antitrust
suit, claiming the end of a bargaining relationship that was present just
hours earlier.286
One key consideration is that a disclaimer can mark the end of union
representation and termination of a bargaining relationship, but it also
can be reversed just as quickly if the union opts to re-form.287 The labor
rights that Judge Nelson and others have emphasized that a union
sacrifices in dissolving are far from being lost forever when a union can
reconstitute just as easily as it disbanded.288 This is critically different
from a formal decertification, which would prohibit a union from reforming for twelve months—a consequence requiring significantly
greater consideration by union members weighing what steps to take.289
In advocating for extending the exemption beyond a union’s disclaimer,
the NFL owners noted the likelihood of resuming collective
bargaining.290 The NFL owners also cited the threat that recognizing
unilateral disclaimers would pose to employers, especially in light of a
union’s ability to manipulate a disclaimer for bargaining purposes.291 As
the NFL and NBA lockouts showed, the players’ antitrust suits—after
they had seemingly ended the bargaining relationship with owners—
were in fact resolved with negotiations culminating in new CBAs and re-

284. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
285. Id. at 241–42 (1996).
286. See supra note 282.
287. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1260 n.223 (“The dissolution of the union, either through
decertification or disclaimer of interest, need not be permanent. In fact, if the employer consents,
there is no limit on how quickly a dissolved union can re-form.”).
288. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1260 n.223.
289. See supra note 127.
290. See supra notes 213, 229.
291. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 45, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“In both situations, the exemption must continue not only because there
is a prospect that collective bargaining will resume, but also because the prospect that the exemption
could abruptly end due to a union’s unilateral action would significantly impede, stifle, and hinder
the collective bargaining process from its outset. Moreover, either can be readily ‘manipulated by
the [union] for bargaining purposes.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
518 U.S. 246 (1996))).
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formation of the respective unions.292
Although Judge Nelson cited the 1991 Powell decision in recognizing
the NFLPA’s 2011 disclaimer, courts also should not be afraid to
distinguish the Powell circumstances.293 By the time Judge Doty ruled in
Powell, the NFL players were eighteen months removed from their
disclaimer.294 Judge Doty found no inconsistent conduct by the players
in that time.295 He also noted that the players suffered in the absence of a
union, with the NFL lengthening the season and reducing their benefits
unilaterally.296 By contrast, the NFLPA was only a month removed from
its disclaimer when Judge Nelson ruled in 2011.297 Judge Nelson
addressed this concern by stating, “The fact that substantial time had
passed in [Powell] since the union’s disclaimer is not controlling here,
because Judge Doty did not condition his ruling on the legal effect of
disclaimer based on any such temporal restrictions.”298
However, courts should revisit the Powell precedent with a better
appreciation for how such disclaimers played out during the 2011
lockouts. A court that extends the nonstatutory labor exemption for a
reasonable period following a players’ union’s disclaimer can both
recognize deserving plaintiffs such as those in Powell while guarding
against destabilizing the bargaining relationship.
B.

Instead, Courts Should Extend Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
Protections for a Reasonable Period Following a Disclaimer

By extending the exemption to shield employers from antitrust
liability for a reasonable period following a union’s disclaimer, courts
would wisely delay recognizing disclaimers from plaintiffs such as those
in Brady while allowing plaintiffs such as those in Powell to pursue
antitrust litigation.299 A union that wanted to expedite its antitrust claims
could opt for formal decertification—which the Supreme Court endorsed
292. See supra notes 229–33, 266–71.
293. See supra notes 134, 156–60.
294. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991). The NFLPA
officially disclaimed representation in November and December 1989; Judge Doty issued his
decision on May 23, 1991. Id. at 1351.
295. Id. at 1358 (“The NFLPA no longer engages in collective bargaining and has also refused
every overture by the NFL defendants to bargain since November of 1989.”).
296. Id. at 1359.
297. Judge Nelson issued her ruling on April 25, 2011. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F.
Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011). The players filed their complaint on March 11, 2011. Id. at 1003–04.
298. Id. at 1041.
299. See Powell, 764 F. Supp. 1351; Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1042–43.
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in Brown as an outer boundary for the nonstatutory labor exemption—
but would sacrifice labor-law rights and the ability to re-form for twelve
months by doing so.300 This would help separate deserving antitrust
claims from tactical moves designed to enhance bargaining leverage.301
This is also in line with courts’ preference for resolving collective
bargaining disputes through “voluntary agreement and labor remedies
rather than judicial intervention.”302
By extending the exemption’s protections for a reasonable period
following a disclaimer, courts also could delay to allow the NLRB to
determine the validity of such a disclaimer.303 As the NFL owners
argued, the validity of a disclaimer is a legal question best reserved to
the agency’s administrative expertise.304 The Supreme Court made clear
in Brown that it would not attempt to draw any dividing lines for the
nonstatutory labor exemption without the NLRB’s specialized
knowledge.305 In her Brady decision, Judge Nelson noted the NLRB’s
300. Some writers have even questioned whether courts should recognize a formal decertification
occurring soon after a stall in bargaining. See Marc J. Yoskowitz, Note, A Confluence of Labor and
Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union Decertification in the National Basketball Association to
Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move Into the Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
579, 617 (1998) (“[Should decertification] take place early in the process, without good faith
attempts at negotiations, and prior to a prolonged impasse, this tactic will be viewed as a sham, and
courts will reject this tactic and maintain the nonstatutory labor exemption.”).
301. Tulane sports law professor Gabriel Feldman argues that players should be able to pursue
antitrust remedies as soon as they dissolve their union. He additionally argues that decertification
and disclaimer of interest equally terminate a union and the collective bargaining relationship. See
Feldman, supra note 59, at 1254–61 (“[A contrary theory] subverts federal labor policy by
effectively depriving employees of their statutorily protected right to opt out of a union by
penalizing their initial involvement with a union.”).
302. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1230.
303. The NFL owners argued in Brady that the NLRB had primary jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of the players’ disclaimer. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 31–39, Brady v. Nat’l
Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“The fact that the District Court felt
the need to engage in that long excursion [into NLRB precedents concerning the validity of
disclaimers] is a clear signal that the court was intruding into the Board’s primary jurisdiction.”).
304. Reply Brief of Appellants at 24, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011
WL 2179417. The NFL argued that the NLRB “and not the District Court, should assess the facts
pertaining to this disclaimer in light of the policies underlying” the National Labor Relations Act.
Id. The NFL owners also noted that the Pittsburgh Steelers ruling was not binding precedent for the
Board and that the advisory opinion did not take into account the NFLPA’s re-formation after 1991.
Id. at 24–25.
During the 2011 lockout, the NFL owners filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB
pursuant to the NLRA. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 10, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 11-1898);
Judy Battista, N.F.L. Claims Union Is Not Bargaining in Good Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at
B14; see also 29 U.S.C. 158 (2006).
305. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“Nor would it be appropriate for
us to do so without the detailed views of the Board, to whose ‘specialized judgment’ Congress
‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to
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long-established criteria for recognizing a disclaimer in finding that she
could apply the standard herself.306 However, the NLRB’s Pittsburgh
Steelers opinion is more than twenty years old and has not been revisited
in the wake of the high-profile disclaimers in 2011 by the NFL and NBA
players.307
The NLRB might very well view the criteria for an unequivocal and
good-faith disclaimer differently now than it did two decades ago. This
is especially possible in light of the many media reports about the
tactical nature of the players’ disclaimers during the 2011 lockouts and
the circumstances through which both lockouts were resolved.308 The
NLRB has emphasized the requirement that a disclaimer constitute a
“sincere abandonment with relative permanency” of bargaining and that
a “bare statement of disclaimer” is not enough.309 At the same time, the
NLRB could endorse the reasoning in the Pittsburgh Steelers opinion.
On one hand, by recognizing such disclaimers as valid, the NLRB risks
allowing unions to switch from bargaining to antitrust litigation at a
moment’s notice, potentially undermining the entire collective
bargaining process. On the other hand, by declining to recognize such
disclaimers, the NLRB strikes a blow to the principle that workers have
as much right not to be represented by a union as to be represented.310
Either way, the extension of the nonstatutory labor exemption would
allow a court to defer to the NLRB on the validity of a disclaimer, as the
Court endorsed in Brown, and again help separate deserving antitrust
claims from the undeserving.
Finally, by extending the exemption protections for a reasonable time
following disclaimer, courts would wisely allow the economic pressures
facing both sides to dictate their ultimate agreement. The billions at
arise in the future.’”).
306. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1019, 1021.
307. In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *1 (June 26, 1991).
308. The NFL players reportedly agreed to decertify days before the expiration of the CBA. Judy
Battista, Sides Seeking Leverage Before Deadline in N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at SP1.
Other reports suggested the tactical nature of the players’ disclaimer: “[U]nion leaders say they
would decertify simply as a way to get players back on the field and to prevent a work stoppage that
threatens the 2011 season.” See Battista, supra note 182.
309. See supra notes 144–49.
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.”
(emphasis added)).
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stake each season in professional sports is simply staggering: the Brady
plaintiffs estimated NFL revenues at $8.5 billion annually;311 the
Anthony plaintiffs estimated NBA revenues at nearly $4 billion
annually.312 Professional athletes, meanwhile, can ill afford to lose a full
season of salary given the brevity of their careers.313 In light of these
factors, courts should appreciate the incentive for both sides to return to
the bargaining table, no matter how frustrated their negotiations. In
2011, even before the Eighth Circuit heard oral arguments concerning
the NFL owners’ appeal, the owners and players had resumed
negotiations.314 After the court issued its decision, the owners and
players went so far as to issue a joint statement expressing “mutual
recognition that this matter must be resolved through negotiation” and
commitment to playing a full season.315 The NFL acknowledged in its
brief to the Eighth Circuit that for all the fears of a lost season, “there is
no reason to assume that [a season will be lost], particularly with the
powerful economic incentive for both sides to come to a
compromise.”316 The NBA, meanwhile, faced pressure from its
television partners, who pay a combined $1 billion a season to broadcast
games.317
Perhaps because of these economic incentives, courts have expressed
strong reluctance to hear such cases in the first place.318 As Judge Kermit
Bye of the Eighth Circuit told the NFL owners and players: “We will
take this case and render a decision in due course. We won’t, I might
also say, be all that hurt that you’re leaving us out if you should go out

311. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
312. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
313. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Conn. 1977) (“The
career of a professional athlete is more limited than that of persons engaged in almost any other
occupation. Consequently the loss of even one year of playing time is very detrimental.”).
314. See Battista, supra note 221. In an interview after oral arguments, Paul Clement said,
“There’s no question that to the extent what’s going on is continuing negotiations, what that
underscores is that the union has not disappeared forever.” Battista, supra note 221. Clement added,
“Everybody can make their own judgment, but the problem with the argument is that it assumes the
union is gone forever, and I don’t think many people who are students of this game or students of
this industry really believe that is a fact.” Battista, supra note 221.
315. See Judy Battista, Court Rules Lockout by N.F.L. Can Go On, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at
D5.
316. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 58, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898), 2011 WL 2003085.
317. See Amy Chozik, Basketball in Doubt, TV Tries to Fill a Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011,
at B3. During the lockout, one cable channel had to substitute episodes of CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation for previously scheduled games. Id.
318. See Battista, supra note 221.
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and settle the case.”319 Judge Bye added that if the court did reach a
decision: “[T]hat’s probably something both sides are not going to like,
but at least it will be a decision.”320 By recognizing a disclaimer as
terminating the bargaining relationship only after a reasonable period,
courts would avoid overriding the economic pressures facing each side
to reach agreement—while avoiding entering cases they have expressed
reluctance to hear in the first place.
For owners and players in professional sports, the economic interests
at stake are so significant that they caution a court not to overreach in
evaluating antitrust claims and the extent of the nonstatutory labor
exemption. Extending the nonstatutory labor exemption for a reasonable
period following disclaimer—such as the year or one business cycle the
NFL owners advocated—would prevent such overreaching. As one
commentator noted following resolution of the NFL lockout, the sides
reached agreement not because of antitrust litigation but through
bargaining—”reluctant bargaining, but bargaining nonetheless.”321
CONCLUSION
With the Eighth Circuit leaving the question unresolved, the NFL and
NBA lockouts failed to answer whether a disclaimer of representation
terminates the bargaining relationship and extinguishes the nonstatutory
labor exemption’s antitrust protections. The Supreme Court expressed in
Brown that “extreme outer boundaries” exist such that the exemption
will not shield employers from antitrust liability indefinitely. However,
the Court also expressed its significant concern about destabilizing the
bargaining process. The prospect of allowing players’ unions to disclaim
representation and immediately file antitrust suits, such as the NFL and
NBA players did during the 2011 lockouts, threatens the stability of the
bargaining process that was of such concern in Brown.
Accordingly, courts considering future disclaimers of representation
should find that nonstatutory labor exemption protections will continue
to shield employers for a reasonable period following disclaimer. A
reasonable period should be defined as one year or one business cycle.
Such an extension would avoid compromising the bargaining process
while allowing courts to better distinguish deserving plaintiffs from
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. See Lester Munson, NFL Lockout Question: Was it Worth it? ESPN.COM, July 26, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/munson-110725/nfl-lockout-settlementquestions-answers.
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those using antitrust law exclusively as a bargaining tactic.322 An
extension additionally would allow courts to delay ruling on the
contested antitrust issues and allow the NLRB to consider the
effectiveness of a disclaimer while avoiding judicial overreaching in
labor disputes where the billions of dollars at stake in a single season are
most likely to shape the ultimate resolution between owners and players.

322. As previously noted, a union that wanted to expedite its antitrust claims could opt for formal
decertification. The Supreme Court endorsed formal decertification in Brown as an outer boundary
for the nonstatutory labor exemption. See supra note 300.

